Abstract: This paper uses firm-level information to examine how the Asian and Russian crises affected different types of firms around the world. It constructs a new data set of financial statistics, industry information, geographic data, and stock returns for over 10,000 companies in 46 countries. Results indicate that firms that competed with exports from the crisis countries, and firms which had direct sales exposure to the crisis countries, had substantially lower abnormal stock returns during these periods. On the other hand, firms with higher debt ratios did not experience significantly lower abnormal returns. Country-specific effects, although important determinants of company stock returns, generally have a smaller impact than the firm-specific characteristics. This series of results suggests that trade channels are important determinants of how crises are transmitted internationally.
I. Introduction
The Asian flu. The Russian virus. The Tequila effect. Contagion. Numerous terms have been invented to explain the same basic phenomenon; a crisis in one country (or region) can affect markets of very different sizes and structures around the globe. While most people would agree that this phenomenon has occurred during at least one of the crises of the 1990's, there is little agreement on exactly why crises are transmitted internationally. For example, during the East Asian crisis, why did the Brazilian stock market index fall by 31 percent in October?
1 And why did the Australian and South African market indices fall by 14 percent over the same period?
Why were these diverse markets so significantly affected by events in East Asia?
After the string of currency crisis in the 1990's, a number of papers have tried to answer these questions. Many papers have developed theories explaining how a crisis in one country can be propagated to markets in other countries. Other papers have used macroeconomic data to test the validity of these theories. This paper, however, takes a different approach. Instead of using aggregate, macro-level data, it utilizes firm-level information. Within any country, there is a large variation in how different companies are affected by a crisis originating elsewhere. Tests based on firm-level data can utilize this variation in individual company performance to help identify what types of firms are most affected by financial crises. These empirical results are not only interesting in and of themselves, but can also provide insights on how country-specific shocks are transmitted internationally.
In order to perform this firm-level analysis, this paper constructs a new data set of financial statistics, industry information, geographic data, and stock returns for over 10,000 companies in 46 countries. It uses this information to test how individual company's stock market returns during the East Asian and Russian crises are affected by factors such as: industry; international exposure; debt quantity and structure; trading liquidity and/or geographic location.
The paper presents preliminary graphical results, which show which types of companies were most affected by these two crises, as well as more informative regression results, which estimate how different company characteristics simultaneously affect firm vulnerability to a crisis.
Results show that firms that compete with exports from the crisis country, or that have direct exposure in the crisis country, are negatively and significantly affected by these events. For example, if a firm's main product line was in the same industry as a major export from East Asia, its abnormal stock return was 8 percent lower, on average, between October and December of the Asian crisis. During the two-week Russian crisis, firms that competed with Russian exports had abnormal stock returns 3 percent lower. If a firm had direct exposure to East Asia or Russia (as measured by a significant share of sales, income or assets in the crisis region), its abnormal stock return was 15 percent lower during the Asian crisis, or 10 percent lower during the Russian crisis.
These results suggest that trade channels, whether through competition in export markets or direct exposure in the crisis country, were important mechanisms transmitting the Asian and Russian crisis to firms around the world.
Results also indicate that firms located outside of the crisis regions that had higher shortterm debt or total debt ratios did not have significantly different abnormal stock returns during either crisis. This could be interpreted as evidence that the Asian and Russian crises did not cause a global credit crunch. Another empirical result is that during the later part of the Asian crisis, more liquid stocks had significantly lower returns than the rest of the sample. Although only suggestive, this supports anecdotal evidence that the Asian crisis caused a forced-portfolio recomposition for global investors (i.e., large cash withdrawals and margin calls forced investors to sell assets in markets not directly affected by the crisis). A final empirical result from both the Asian and Russian crises is that country-specific effects can be large, although they are difficult to explain with a variety of macroeconomic and corporate governance variables. Moreover, in most cases the magnitude of these country-specific effects is smaller than the firm-specific characteristics discussed above.
The remainder of this paper is divided into six sections. Section II surveys the theoretical literature on the international transmission of crises and reinterprets much of this literature in the context of how individual firms could be affected by crises in other countries. It also discusses the aggregate empirical work testing these theories and how a firm-level analysis could augment this work. Section III describes the extensive firm-level data set that was compiled for this paper.
Next, Section IV uses an event-study methodology to present a graphical analysis of stock returns for various portfolios after the East Asian and Russian crises. This univariate analysis has a number of econometric problems. Section V addresses these problems and estimates how different types of firms were affected by these two crises. It focuses on an estimation technique developed by Sefcik and Thompson. This section closes by taking a closer look at the large country-specific effects and tests if a number of macroeconomic and corporate governance variables can explain these effects. Section VI reports an extensive set of robustness tests and Section VII concludes with a number of caveats.
1 Based on market indices in US$ reported by Datastream.
II. Theory and Previous Evidence
Over the past few years, an extensive literature has explored why country-specific crises can have such widespread global effects. Recent surveys of this literature have used a variety of approaches toward coherently organizing this research. 2 This paper draws on these approaches, but use a different framework and terminology in order to focus on how crises affect firms, instead of countries, around the world. More specifically, this section explains that a crisis in one country could affect firms in other countries through five channels: product competitiveness, an income effect, a credit crunch, a forced-portfolio recomposition, or a wake-up calls. The section also briefly reviews the macroeconomic empirical work testing each channel's importance. It concludes by discussing how a firm-level analysis can use the within-country variation in company performance to provide important insights for this body of research.
The first channel by which a crisis in one country could be transmitted to firms in other countries is product competitiveness. 3 If one country devalues its currency, then that country's exports will be relatively cheaper in international markets. Similar products from firms in other countries which are sold in the same markets (including the country which initially devalued) will be relatively less competitive. Moreover, if exports from the initial country are a large enough share of global production in a given industry, then industry prices could fall worldwide.
Therefore, even if a company does not directly compete with firms from the crisis country in any specific market, a product's competitiveness could be damaged by the currency crisis. A second mechanism by which a crisis in one country could be propagated internationally is through an income effect that lowers demand for a firm's product. When a country undergoes a financial crisis or negative shock of any type, economic growth generally slows, often to the point of a severe economic contraction. Income in the country will fall, and any firm which exports to that country will face reduced demand (as long as the firm's product is not an inferior good). This income effect will be magnified if the country's currency is devalued, since a devaluation would further reduce purchasing power and real income levels.
Tests of these first two transmission mechanisms are often lumped together as tests of "trade". Papers by Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) and Glick and Rose (1999) argue that 2 For recent surveys, see Claessens, Dornbusch, and Park (2001) and Forbes and Rigobon (2001) . 3 Gerlach and Smets (1995) developed the first formal model of these effects. They focus on how the collapse of a currency affects the competitiveness of economies whose currencies remain pegged. Corsetti, Pesenti, Roubini and Tille (2000) provide a recent extension of these ideas based on micro-foundations. Forbes (2002) provides a detailed discussion of several channels by which trade can spread currency crises. 4 There could be "secondary-product competitiveness" effects if exports from the country which devalued are used as inputs in the production of goods in other countries. In this case, the currency crisis could improve the competitiveness of these other products.
currency crises spread across countries mainly through international trade linkages and not through a revision of expectations based on macroeconomic similarities. Forbes (2002) uses industry level data and also finds strong evidence of both competitiveness and income effects during a series of crises in the later half of the 1990's. As predicted in the theoretical models, she finds greater evidence of competitiveness effects when crisis countries devalue their currencies, and greater evidence of income effects when countries raise interest rates. Papers by Masson (1998) and Baig and Goldfajn (1999) , however, argue that trade was not a significant transmission mechanism during recent crises, because these linkages (both direct and in third markets) were small.
A third channel through which firms can be affected by crises in other countries is a credit crunch. There are several different variants of this theory, but underlying them all is the idea that a crisis in one country leads to a sharp reduction in the supply of credit, reducing financial liquidity and generating an excess demand for credit at the prevailing interest rates. For example, Goldfajn and Valdés (1997) develop a model in which financial intermediaries supply liquid assets to companies. 5 A financial shock to one country causes investors in that country to withdraw their deposits, reducing the liquidity of financial intermediaries and forcing them to liquidate loans to firms in other countries and/or be unable to renew their financing in the future.
Although there continues to be an unresolved debate on whether the Asian crisis caused a credit crunch within Asia, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) provide evidence that common bank creditors transmitted this crisis to other emerging markets.
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A fourth channel by which crises could be transmitted internationally is through a forcedportfolio recomposition. Valdés (1996) develops a model in which a shock to one market reduces the liquidity of individual investors and forces them to sell assets in order to satisfy margin calls, raise cash to fulfill investor redemptions, and/or to meet regulatory requirements. Rather then sell assets whose prices have already collapsed (i.e. assets in the crisis country), the investors will sell other assets in their portfolio. Frankel and Schmukler (1998) find evidence of this effect during the 1994 Mexican peso crisis, and document these effects during the Mexican, East Asian and Russian crises. Other papers, however, argue that any portfoliorecomposition effect during recent crises was fairly unimportant in magnitude, since net 5 Also see Chang and Velasco (2001) which focuses on the maturity mismatch of a financial system's international assets and liabilities. There is also an extensive literature on credit crunches that does not explicitly focus on the international transmission of credit crunches, and which is beyond the scope of this paper.
6 Also see Peek and Rosengreen (1997) , which finds evidence of reduced lending by Japanese banks in the US after the 1990 Japanese stock market crash. investors may use this information to reassess the probability of other countries being bailed out.
Similarly, even if the crisis country is bailed out, this could deplete an international institution's supply of funds and reduce its ability to respond to the next crisis. A final subgroup of wake-up call theories focuses on informational asymmetries, herding, coordination problems and/or informational cascades.
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A series of empirical papers have examined these various wake-up call effects, with a range of results. Sachs et al. (1996) and Tornell (1999) argue that three macro-fundamentals (real exchange rate overvaluation, banking system fragility, and low international reserves)
significantly affect the probability of a crisis. Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (2000) report that corporate governance measures, such as the effectiveness of protection for minority shareholders, are more significant than macroeconomic measures in explaining the impact of the Asian crisis on a range of emerging markets. 11 Baig and Goldfajn (1999) find evidence of country reevaluation and/or herding effects. On the other hand, and as mentioned above, Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) and Glick and Rose (1999) argue that trade is far more important than country reevaluation in the international transmission of crises.
It is worth noting that the five potential transmission channels discussed in this section are not mutually exclusive and could overlap in important ways. For example, if a crisis in one country generates a wake-up call effect that causes investors to lose confidence in another country, the second country may raise interest rates in order to reduce the resulting capital outflow. The higher interest rates could in turn cause a credit crunch. Moreover, the relative importance of each propagation mechanism will depend on the specific characteristics of the original country (or region) that experiences the crisis. For example, if a country has a small share of exports in global markets, a devaluation of that country's currency would be unlikely to generate a significant product-competitiveness effect.
This literature review has shown that there are a range of theories explaining how crises might affect firms around the world, but little empirical consensus on the relative importance of various transmission channels. These analyses based on macroeconomic data, however, ignore a tremendous wealth of information that is lost in the aggregation used to create the statistics.
Within each country, there is a large variation in how different companies are affected by financial crises. For example, if a devaluation in one country increases the competitiveness of its exports, firms in other countries should only be directly affected by the devaluation if they sell products which compete with those exports. Companies which produce non-traded goods should be less affected by the devaluation. Empirical studies that simply look at a country's aggregate trade statistics, balance of payments, or total market returns, will ignore these important differential effects across firms. This paper, however, attempts to fill this gap in the empirical literature and use this firm-level variation to identify which types of companies are most affected by crises that originate elsewhere, thereby providing a very different set of evidence suggesting how crises are transmitted internationally.
III. The Firm-Level Data Set
The obvious challenge in undertaking this firm-level analysis is that these micro-level tests require a larger data set composed of less readily-available statistics. underrepresented. These problems are magnified by the requirement that all firms in the sample are actively traded. A second problem is that although Worldscope attempts to correct for major differences in cross-country accounting standards, significant differences may still exist for 13 Returns are calculated as the difference in logs and are not adjusted for inflation. Returns were also adjusted for weekends, with no significant impact on the results. 14 Countries excluded are: Liechtenstein, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe. 15 Actively-traded stocks are defined as stocks with non-zero returns for at least 50 percent of the trading days during the given period. I also exclude any stocks which are delisted (due to bankruptcy, merger, or any other reason) during the given period. Reasonable modifications to this definition have no significant impact on results. As shown at the bottom of 
IV. Graphical Analysis
This section uses this firm-level data set to construct a series of graphs showing preliminary evidence of how different types of companies were affected by the Asian and Russian crises. The first part of this section explains the basic event-study methodology and estimates a market model of normal stock returns before each crisis. It then uses these estimated coefficients to calculate abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for each stock after each crisis. The second part of this section aggregates these abnormal returns into different stock portfolios to graph which groups of companies were more vulnerable to the East Asian and Russian crises.
A. Methodology
In order to construct these graphs, I follow the standard event-study methodology outlined in MacKinlay (1997 Admittedly, the Asian crisis had several different phases, and the analysis below will examine the behavior of stock portfolios during these different phases. For each phase, however, I continue to use the same one-year window ending on June 24th to estimate normal returns, so that estimates are not contaminated by unusual stock movements in earlier phases of the crisis.
Next, I utilize the parameter estimates from equation 1 during the pre-crisis period to calculate abnormal returns for each stock after the crisis. I define the Russian crisis as lasting for two weeks (ending on August 31, 1998) and I define two phases of the Asian crisis. The first phase is the period when the lower-income Asian economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) were subject to speculative attacks and forced to float their currencies.
I define this period as lasting for 12 weeks (ending on September 16, 1997) and call this period "Asia-Phase 1." The second phase is the period when the higher-income Asian economies (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) also were subject to speculative attacks and experienced significant declines in the values of their currencies (except Hong Kong). I define this period as starting on October 1 and lasting for 12 weeks (ending on December 24, 1997). I name this period "Asia-Phase 2." It is obviously possible to use different definitions for each of these crisis 18 The global market return is calculated using daily prices in local currency reported by Datastream for each country's market index. Weights for the global index are based on total market capitalization at the end of the year prior to the crisis as reported in International Finance Corporation (1999) . 19 More specifically, on August 17 th the Russian government raised the band for the ruble exchange rate, defaulted on its treasury bills, and declared a ninety-day moratorium on foreign debt payments. The currency did not officially float until August 27 th . 20 As recently as May of 1997, the Thai government had pledged public commitment to support Finance One. Reneging on this promise threatened the extensive system of government backing (both implicit and explicit). See Radelet and Sachs (1998) or Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999) for a detailed accounting of key events in the Asian crisis.
periods so the sensitivity analysis performs a detailed analysis of the impact of modifying these period definitions.
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Using these definitions, the abnormal return ( τ ε î ) for firm i during time τ of the crisis period (i.e. event window) of length C is therefore:
(2) C 1,2,..., with
where each of the fitted parameters is estimated by equation (1) during the pre-crisis period. I continue to exclude any stocks which are not actively traded (as defined above) during the crisis period. Finally, I add the abnormal returns for each stock over any period L (with L ≤ C) to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs):
These CARs are utilized in the graphs for the remainder of this section.
B. Graphical Results
Once the CARs have been calculated for each stock, it is possible to compare different stock portfolios to see which types of firms were more vulnerable to the East Asian and Russian crises.
As discussed in Section II, there are five channels by which each crisis could have affected firms in other countries: product competitiveness, an income effect, a credit crunch, a forced-portfolio recomposition, or a wake-up call. Although data availability and econometric problems make it impossible to construct definitive tests of each of these channels, graphs of different stock portfolios can provide suggestive evidence on the importance of the first four effects.
The first potential effect, product competitiveness, argues that if a crisis country devalues its currency, its exports will gain a competitive advantage. Therefore, after the crisis, firms which compete with major exports from the crisis country should experience lower returns than companies which do not compete in those sectors. To test this effect, I define "major exports" from the crisis zone as the four-digit SITC groups for which total exports from countries in the crisis zone are 25 percent or more of total exports in the entire world.
22 By focusing on total exports from the crisis zone (instead of total production), I implicitly exclude goods that would not be expected to experience competitiveness effects because they are non-traded, have high transport costs, and/or are subject to any sort of trade restrictions. Table 3 lists the SITC groups and the corresponding SIC categories that are "major exports" for each crisis zone. Granted, this classification procedure is not a precise measure of competitiveness and has a number of problems, but it does provide a rough approximation of what industries are most likely to be affected by the crises. 23 Moreover, the sensitivity analysis shows that modifications to this indicator have a minimal impact on results.
Next, I use the four-digit SIC codes listed in Table 3 to divide the firms in my data set into two portfolios for each crisis: companies whose primary output competes with exports from the crisis zone (i.e. is in the same 4-digit SIC group) and companies whose primary output does not compete. 24 Figures I through III graph the CARs of each portfolio over time for each crisis period, as well as the one-week before each crisis. The horizontal axes are labeled in event time,
with the dashed line at zero indicating the starting date of the relevant crisis. Figure I shows that during the first phase of the Asian crisis, firms which produced in the same four-digit SIC groups as the major exports from the low-income Asian economies did not experience significantly lower returns than other firms in the sample. On the other hand, figure II shows that during the second phase of the Asian crisis, firms which competed with major Asian exports had average abnormal returns over 11 percent lower than average abnormal returns in the rest of the sample (for the entire 60-day period). This effect was particularly strong during November and December when the Korean won was under attack. Figure III shows that during the later part of the Russian collapse of the Indonesian rupiah after the initial collapse of the Thai baht). This stream of events which unwound slowly over several months provided critical information on the extent and severity of the crisis. 22 The crisis zone for Asia-Phase 1 is defined as: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. The crisis zone for Asia-Phase 2 is defined as: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. The Russian crisis zone is simply Russia. Information on exports by SITC group is taken from International Trade Centre/UN Statistics Division (1999). Export information is for the full year preceding the relevant crisis. 23 One problem is that different countries could produce goods of varying quality within the same 4-digit category and therefore not compete directly. Another problem is that all firm sales are included under the firm's primary SIC code and companies could simultaneously produce in other sectors. A third problem is that some of the SIC codes available for each company do not directly correspond to the SITC codes available for each country. A final problem is that SITC export information is not available for Taiwan. As a result, I do not include Taiwanese exports in my calculation of major exports during the second phase of the Asian crisis. 24 Throughout this section, reported results are based on equally-weighted portfolios. Estimates based on market-weighted portfolios are not significantly different. Also, I do not include firms from the relevant crisis area in either portfolio for two reasons. First, these firms are not relevant to this paper's investigation of how a crisis in one country affects firms in other countries. Second, crises could affect local firms differently, such as increasing the competitiveness of their exports instead of decreasing it.
crisis, firms that competed with major Russian exports had average abnormal returns about 3 percent lower (for the entire 10-day period). These results suggest that product-competitiveness effects helped transmit the Asian crisis (in its later phase) and Russian crisis to firms in other countries.
The second channel by which a crisis could affect firms internationally is an income effect. A country (or region) suffering from a crisis generally experiences lower growth rates and a contraction of aggregate demand, which reduces the profitability of firms that sell in that country (or region.) To test this effect, I calculate the direct trade exposure (as measured by the percent of sales, operating income, and assets) each firm has in Russia and the relevant Asiancrisis countries during the one year preceding the relevant crisis. This classification procedure is not precise, since many companies report sales, income and assets by region instead of by country, but it does provide a useful proxy of a firm's direct exposure to the crisis zone. These results suggest that income effects could have helped transmit the Asian (during its later phase) and Russian crises to firms internationally.
The third channel by which a crisis in one country could affect firms in other countries is a global credit crunch. As discussed in Section II, there are several different variants of this theory, but underlying them all is the idea that a crisis in one country leads to a sharp reduction in the international supply of credit, raising the cost of credit to firms in other countries. A direct implication of this theory is that companies more reliant on short-term debt to finance inventories and provide working capital would be more affected by a crisis. As a preliminary test of this 25 Russia is often grouped with Europe and individual Asian countries are often grouped together as Asia. In order to be consistent, I only include exposure that is specifically linked to the relevant country. For example, for the first stage of the Asian crisis, I only include sales, income, or assets which are specifically labeled as occurring in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, or Thailand. I do not include sales, income, or assets labeled as occurring in "Asia".
theory, I use each firm's ratio of net short-term debt to equity to divide the sample of firms into two portfolios: those more highly dependent on short-term financing and those less dependent.
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Figures VII through IX graph the CARs for the two crisis periods. These figures show no evidence that firms more reliant on short-term debt were differentially affected by the Asian or Russian crises. In fact, during the second phase of the Asian crisis and the Russian crisis, firms more dependent on short-term debt had slightly higher-instead of lower-abnormal returns than the rest of the sample. Results are identical if the sample is divided into portfolios based on total debt dependence (such as total debt/equity or total debt/assets). It is worth noting that these comparisons are very rough tests of a credit crunch, since firms more reliant on short-term debt (or with higher total debt ratios) could experience lower returns during the crisis for other reasons. For example, firms more dependent on debt financing could be smaller, riskier, and/or more highly leveraged. Since these types of firms could be more vulnerable to a crisis for reasons other than a credit crunch, it is surprising that the difference between stock portfolios in Figures VII through IX is not greater.
A forced-portfolio recomposition, the fourth channel, suggests that after a crisis investors may need to sell assets in markets not directly affected by the crisis in order to meet certain requirements. It is impossible to test this effect directly using this paper's firm-level data set. One implication of these theories, however, is that a company is more vulnerable to a forced sell-off if a larger percent of its shares is held by institutions (such as mutual funds) that could be subject to the regulatory requirements or cash redemptions which that drive this type of portfolio recomposition. Moreover, Falkenstein (1996) shows that mutual funds tend to bias their investment toward more liquid stocks. Therefore, since more liquid stocks tend to have a higher share of institutional ownership, they may be more susceptible to a forced-portfolio recomposition. 27 As an extremely rough test of this effect, I calculate each stock's liquidity as the percent of trading days for which stock returns are non-zero (in the pre-crisis period). Then, I
define highly-liquid stocks as those for which returns are non-zero in at least 75 percent of the pre-crisis trading days. 28 All other stocks are classified as less liquid (but due to the requirements discussed in Section III, are still "actively traded".) 26 The sensitivity analysis uses another measure of short-term-debt and total-debt dependence to construct these portfolios. Results do not change significantly. For each crisis, I use the sample median as the division between more-dependent and less-dependent firms. The sample median of net short-term debt to equity is 0.70 percent during the East Asian crisis and 0.56 percent during the Russian crisis. 27 Claessens, Dornbusch and Park (2001) also make this point. 28 I use this measure of stock liquidity since it is available for all of the companies in the sample. More traditional measures of liquidity are not as widely available. In a series of sensitivity tests, I utilized a number of these alternate measures of liquidity, and although the sample size shrinks significantly, the central results do not change. The sensitivity analysis reports one such set of results.
Figures X through XII graph the CARs for portfolios of highly-liquid and less-liquid stocks for each crisis. During the first phase of the Asian crisis and the Russian crisis, there is little difference between the two portfolios. During the second phase of the Asian crisis, however, highly liquid stocks have average returns about 6 percent lower than the less-liquid stocks.
Although stock liquidity is a very rough proxy for capturing any sort of portfolio-recomposition effect, these results support anecdotal evidence suggesting that this effect could have been important during the second phase of the Asian crisis.
V. Multivariate Regression Analysis
It is impossible to draw strong conclusions from this type of univariate approach used in the above graphical analysis. If two (or more) firm characteristics are highly correlated, then it is difficult to isolate the impact of a specific characteristic on stock returns. For example, larger firms are more likely to have direct sales exposure to a given crisis region, and larger firms may be less vulnerable to global crises (if investors switch to larger, more stable companies after a shock). In this case, a portfolio of firms with direct trade exposure to a crisis region may outperform firms with no exposure to the region, although this difference in performance has no direct relationship to the variable under consideration (exposure to the region).
Moreover, there are a number of econometric problems with the simple model estimated in equations 1 through 3, so statistical tests based on this model are invalid. This section addresses both of these issues and utilizes a methodology developed by Sefcik and Thompson (1986) to estimate how the Asian and Russian crises affected different types of firms located outside the crisis regions. The first part of this section discusses the estimation methodology and the second part reports a central set of multivariate regression results. The final part of this section focuses on one result-the large and highly significant country-specific effects-and discusses a number of explanations for these effects.
A. Methodology
The standard methodology for estimating the effect of different firm characteristics on stock market returns during an event is to regress the abnormal returns or cumulative abnormal returns (calculated in equations 1-3) on the firm characteristics of interest. For example, if τ is the (N x 1) vector of average abnormal returns (for the sample of N stocks) during the portion of the crisis period τ , and F is an (N x K) matrix of firm characteristics (with the first column a vector of ones), the standard technique is to estimate the cross-section relationship:
where is the (K x 1) vector of coefficients and τ is an (N x 1) vector of disturbances.
Under several mild regularity conditions, this three-step approach is equivalent to the two-step methodology described in Sefcik and Thompson (1986) . Sefcik and Thompson rewrite the basic model of equations 1-4 as: OLS estimates obtained using either of these methodologies are only consistent and efficient, however, if the disturbances are i.i.d. in the cross-section. The data set described in Section III violates this assumption for two reasons. First, the disturbances are not homoscedastic across firms. For two firms i and j during any time period t, either:
for all i and j in equation (1); or
for all i and j in equation (5) .
As a result, standard errors will be biased and coefficient estimates will be inefficient. It is straightforward to adjust for this problem by using any heteroscedastic-consistent estimator.
Second, and more problematic, is the fact that disturbances are not independent across firms. For two firms i and j during any time period t, either:
for all i and j in equation (5).
This problem occurs because all firms in the sample are affected by the crisis at the same time,
(as opposed to most event studies where the "event", such as a stock split, occurs for different firms on different dates.) The resulting cross-correlation in disturbances across firms causes standard errors to be biased and inconsistent. One technique for adjusting for this problem is to use a GLS estimator that utilizes the covariance matrix of returns for firms in the pre-crisis period. This technique is not feasible, however, for a large number of firms, and generally requires that the number of time periods is greater than the number of firms (i.e. that T>N.) 29 This requirement is clearly not satisfied in the data set described in Section III.
An alternative solution is utilized by Sefcik and Thompson (1986) and builds on the model of equations 4-6. Basically, Sefcik and Thompson propose dividing the sample of firms into different portfolios and then using these portfolios to estimate the impact of firm characteristics on returns during a specific event. By dividing the sample into a smaller dimension (K portfolios instead of N companies), it is possible to simultaneously correct for heteroscedasticity and the cross-correlation in returns. Coefficient estimates and standard errors are unbiased and consistent. 30 Appendix B describes this procedure in more detail. The remainder of this paper focuses on Sefcik and Thompson's estimation technique, but for comparison, will also report estimates obtained using the traditional procedures that yield biased standard errors.
One final estimation issue is that, as discussed in Section III, the Worldscope data contains a number of extreme outliers. Many are undoubtedly reporting errors, but it is difficult to judge which outliers are mistakes and which represent unusual corporate practices (such as the extremely high debt/equity ratios of several Asian firms). Therefore, instead of trying to evaluate which outliers to drop, I estimate the relevant model for each specification and then remove extreme outliers (defined as having standard errors greater than three times the standard deviation 29 For an example and proof of these claims, see Collins and Dent (1984) . 30 GLS coefficient estimates are efficient, but as discussed above, these are not feasible for this sample.
from the sample mean). After dropping these outliers, I repeat the estimation of the relevant model.
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B. Central Results
The model that forms the base specification for this paper is written in equations 5 through 10.
The technique used to estimate this model is described in Section V.A, and definitions for the precrisis and crisis periods are discussed in Section IV.A. For consistency with the graphical analysis, the matrix of explanatory variables (F) includes the same firm characteristics and variable definitions as discussed in Section IV.B. More specifically, the four explanatory variables (export competition, direct trade exposure, debt outstanding, and stock liquidity) are meant to correspond, as closely as possible given data limitations, to four channels by which a crisis could affect firms in other countries (product competitiveness, an income effect, a credit crunch, and a forced-portfolio recomposition). 32 I also control for any country-fixed effects in each regression (with Germany as the omitted country). Most of the results reported in Table 4 support the preliminary graphical evidence reported above. During the first phase of the Asian crisis none of the four central coefficients are significant (and half do not even have the predicted signs). During the second phase of the Asian crisis, the export competition, direct trade exposure, and stock liquidity coefficients are all highly significant (at the 1 percent level) and the debt outstanding coefficient is insignificant. Moreover, these estimates suggest that the magnitude of these effects could be large. For example, the export competition coefficient indicates that firms which produced in the same industries as the "major 31 Results do not change significantly if I use other tests for outliers, such as Cook's distance statistic or simply plotting residuals and removing observations which visually appear to be extreme outliers. 32 For information on variable definitions, see Section IV, Appendix A and/or the footnotes to Table 4. exports" from the crisis economies had average daily returns 13 basis points lower than firms which did not produce in these sectors. Although 13 basis points appears to be small, when this daily impact is aggregated over the entire 60-day crisis period, this translates into an abnormal return 8 percentage points lower over the entire crisis period. The direct trade exposure coefficient suggests that companies with sales, income or assets in the Asian-crisis region experienced average daily abnormal returns 25 basis points lower, and average aggregate returns over 15 percentage points lower (over the entire crisis period). Finally, the stock liquidity coefficient indicates that more liquid stocks had average daily returns 7 basis points lower than less liquid stocks, for a total average abnormal return 4 percentage points lower over the entire crisis period.
During the Russian crisis, the coefficients on export competition and direct trade exposure continue to be highly significant. More specifically, the export competition coefficient indicates that firms which produced in the same industries as "major exports" from Russia had average daily returns 32 basis points lower than firms which did not produce in these industries.
Over the entire 10-day crisis period, this translates into an average abnormal return about 3
percentage points lower than companies that did not compete with Russian exports. The direct trade exposure coefficient suggests that companies with sales, income or assets in Russia experienced average daily returns 101 basis points lower, and an average abnormal return 10 percentage points lower over the entire crisis. Finally, the debt outstanding and stock liquidity coefficients are not significant during the Russian crisis.
One key result that emerges from this series of regressions is that the impact on firms around the world varies across each phase of the Asian crisis and the Russian crisis. This is not surprising. How each crisis spreads should be highly dependent on the specific characteristics of the country (or countries) where the crisis originates and, in particular, on how that country is related to the rest of the world. For example, the export competition coefficient was large and significant during the second stage of the Asian crisis and the Russian crisis, and insignificant during the first stage of the Asian crisis. This is because the "major exports" from the lowerincome Asian countries listed in Table 3 constituted a smaller share of total global exports than during either of the other crisis periods. 33 These different patterns across crises, and especially the stronger effects during the later phase of the Asian crisis (when the larger countries were under speculative attack), could also indicate non-linearities in the transmission of crises. Since this paper only includes the Asian and Russian crises, it is difficult to perform any meaningful crosssection regression analysis linking crisis-country characteristics with how the crisis affects firms internationally or any related non-linearities. These issues merit further research, but at the very least, this paper's results suggest that how a crisis is transmitted is closely related to characteristics of the country (or region) where the crisis originates.
To summarize the key results of this section, regression estimates show that during the second phase of the Asian crisis and the Russian crisis, firms that competed with exports from the crisis countries, or that had direct trade exposure to the crisis countries, had significantly lower stock returns. This suggests that product-competitiveness and income effects were both important transmission mechanisms during these periods. Results also show that firms located outside the crisis countries with higher short-term debt or total debt ratios did not have significantly lower stock returns during any of the three crisis periods. This suggests that a global credit crunch may not have been an important mechanism transmitting these crises internationally. 34 More liquid stocks had significantly lower returns than the rest of the sample during the second phase of the Asian crisis, and although this is not a formal test of any forced-portfolio recomposition effect, it does support the anecdotal evidence that this channel may have been important. A final result from this series of tests is that the impact of financial crises on firms around the world varies across episodes.
C. A Closer Look at the Country-Specific Effects
An additional result from this series of regressions is that the country-specific effects are jointly significant during each crisis period, even after controlling for a variety of firm-specific variables. Given the wide range of factors that could drive either of these explanations for the large country-specific effects, it is extremely difficult to account for these effects empirically.
Moreover, since this paper focuses on how recent financial crises have affected individual companies, instead of individual countries, a thorough investigation of this topic is beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, since the country-specific effects are so large, this section provides a preliminary analysis of which types of variables might drive these effects. It begins by analyzing a number of macroeconomic statistics and corporate governance indicators that could drive the first group of explanations, and then discusses informal evidence supporting the second group of explanations. The section concludes by discussing how these country-level effects are, in most cases, less important than the firm-level effects that are the focus of this paper.
The first group of explanations for the large country-specific effects is that the Asian or Russian crisis prompted a change in investors' assessment of (or behavior toward) other countries.
A number of papers have analyzed whether macroeconomic and/or corporate governance variables might cause this reassessment and affect a country's vulnerability to a crisis. 36 I follow the general approach used in this literature to test whether a range of country-level variables can explain the large country-specific movements in stock prices. More specifically, I test for the importance of four macroeconomic variables (a current account deficit, a government budget deficit, a low level of international reserves, and a lower level of per capita income) and four corporate governance variables (weaker shareholder rights, a higher prevalence of corruption, a higher risk that assets will be expropriated, and a weaker rule of law). Specific definitions for all of these variables and data sources are listed in Appendix C. 36 Recent work analyzing the role of macroeconomic variables in the transmission of financial crises includes: Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) , Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) , Glick and Rose (1999) , Reinhart (1999), and Tornell (1999) . Recent work analyzing the role of corporate governance in the transmission of financial crises includes: Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2000) and Claessens, Djankov and Klapper (2000) . Mitton (2002) examines the impact of several corporate governance variables on stock returns for a sample of East Asian firms. Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (2000) is the only empirical paper to simultaneously analyze the role of both macroeconomic and corporate governance variables. See this body of literature for further information on why any of these variables might affect a country's vulnerability to a crisis. Also see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) for further information on the corporate governance variables used in this section. Table 6 reports the results for each crisis period from a regression of the country-specific effects reported in Table 5 Another explanation for the large country-specific effects is that they are driven by domestic events that are unique to each country and unrelated to the Asian or Russian crises.
Although this explanation is impossible to test with this paper's data set, a simple examination of the country effects in Table 5 suggests that this explanation could be important. During the second phase of the Asian crisis, two of the largest country-specific effects occurred in Ireland and South Africa-two countries that elected new presidents during this period. One of the largest negative effects was for Brazil, which announced a new economic plan of higher interest rates, tax increases and spending cuts, which would undoubtedly slow economic growth. During 37 I do not pool the sample across crisis periods because different macroeconomic and corporate governance variables could play different roles during each period, based on the characteristics of the country where the crisis originated. 38 For example, I have added a number of additional macroeconomic variables such as: banking system strength; growth in the money supply; growth in GDP per capita; the ratio of total debt to GDP; the ratio of short-term debt to total debt; inflation; extent of any recent lending boom; openness; and a measure of exchange rate overvaluation. I have also added a number of additional corporate governance variables such as: accounting standards; the risk of contract repudiation; creditor rights; judicial efficiency; and corruption perceptions. All of the macroeconomic variables are from World Bank (2000) and all of the corporate governance variables (except the last) are from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998 
VI. Sensitivity Tests and Model Extensions
The estimates reported above are based on a number of strong assumptions and simplifications.
Therefore, this section performs a number of sensitivity tests. More specifically, it examines the impact of: reclassifying period definitions; redefining key variables; and modifying the base model specification. Due to space constraints, I do not show the univariate graphs or report all of the multivariate regression results. 41 Any results that differ significantly from the base estimates reported above, however, are discussed in detail.
regional dummy variables and tested for the impact of dropping each of the variables in the base specification. 39 Colombia has the median estimate of the absolute values for all the country-specific effects during the second phase of the Asian crisis. 40 These comparisons are versus a company: (a) whose main product line is not one of the major exports from the Asian crisis zone; (b) which does not have over 5 percent of sales, assets or income in the Asian crisis zone; and (c) which is based in Germany (the country excluded from the regression.) 41 Full regression results for these sensitivity tests are available from the author.
A. Sensitivity Tests I: Reclassifying Period Definitions
As a first set of sensitivity tests, I reclassify the period definitions used in the base analysis. To test if any of these factors affect the central results reported in Section V, I modify the period definitions used for the base analysis. For each crisis, I estimate the same model and use the same start date, but define the crisis period as lasting one week, two weeks, one month, two months, three months and six months. Results are reported in Table 7 and in each case the base case from Section V is highlighted. For the first phase of the Asian crisis, none of the coefficients (except the country dummy variables) are significant for any of the time periods. This is even true over the longest time period (24 weeks), which includes the second phase of the Asian crisis. This suggests that most of the impact of the second phase of the Asian crisis is driven by the higherincome Asian economies which are not included in the first phase of the crisis.
For the second phase of the Asian crisis, none of the coefficients (except the country dummy variables) are significant when the crisis is defined as lasting one or two weeks. This is not surprising given that the main "crisis events" for the high-income Asian economies occurred after this period. After two weeks, however, the export competition coefficient becomes significant, and after eight weeks the stock liquidity coefficient becomes significant. Over the longest time horizon (24 weeks), the export competition and direct trade exposure coefficients remain significant, although the stock liquidity coefficient becomes insignificant. These results support the hypothesis that the different effects of crises vary across different time horizons, and in particular, that any portfolio-recomposition effect captured by the stock liquidity variable is a shorter-term propagation channel.
Results for the final period, the Russian crisis, also fluctuate based on the time period under consideration. The direct trade exposure coefficient is significant when the crisis period is defined as lasting eight weeks or less. The export competition coefficient is only significant when the crisis is defined as lasting two weeks or longer than twelve weeks (and the coefficient even becomes positive over the four and eight-week periods). This could indicate that several weeks into the Russian crisis, investors believed that domestic turmoil (such as problems with the payments mechanism and crime) would disrupt production, counteracting any competitive advantage from the devaluation of the ruble. Over the longer time period, however, when Russian production did not collapse, the export competition variable has the predicted effect. Similarly, when the Russian economy did not collapse, the earnings loss from operating in Russia may have been less than predicted, rendering the direct trade exposure variable became insignificant. As a whole, it is difficult to draw any strong conclusions from the longer periods during the Russian crisis because the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management occurred about one month after the defined start of the Russian crisis.
As a final sensitivity test for the impact of varying period definitions, I modify the start date for each crisis. I start each crisis one and two weeks earlier than defined above. Coefficient estimates do not change significantly.
B. Sensitivity Tests II: Redefining Key Variables
As a next series of sensitivity tests, I examine the impact of redefining each of the variables in the base analysis. The first variable, export competition, measures whether a firm produced in the same industry as a "major export" from the crisis zone. As a sensitivity test, I use sample information (instead of world export information) to define "major industries" for the crisis zone.
This classification is even more imprecise than that used above. Regression results are reported in columns (2) and (7) of Table 8 . 43 Despite the substantial changes in this variable, coefficient estimates are remarkably stable for both phases of the Asian crisis. During the Russian crisis, however, the export competition coefficient becomes insignificant. This is not surprising as Russia's only major industry, according to this new variable, is the broad "metal mining."
The second variable in the base specification, direct trade exposure, is a dummy variable equal to one if a company has over five percent of sales, assets, or income in the crisis region. I try changing this definition by using ten or twenty percent as the cutoff. The number of companies with direct exposure to the crisis zone falls substantially, but the coefficient remains large and significant during the second phase of the Asian crisis and the Russian crisis, and insignificant during the first phase of the Asian crisis.
The third variable in the base specification, debt outstanding, is measured by the ratio of net short-term debt to equity. There are a number of other ratios that could also capture a firm's dependence on short-term financing or bank financing and its potential vulnerability to a credit crunch. Therefore, I try eight different variable definitions. 44 When I re-estimate the base regression using these alternate definitions, the debt outstanding coefficient is never significant for the first phase of the Asian crisis or the Russian crisis, and the coefficient often has an unexpected sign. During the second phase of the Asian crisis, most of the debt outstanding coefficients continue to be insignificant, and their signs fluctuate. In every case, redefining the debt outstanding variable has no significant impact on any of the other coefficient estimates.
Finally, I redefine the fourth variable in the base regression, stock liquidity, as the percent of shares traded to shares outstanding. Since this measure is not available for a majority of firms, the sample size shrinks significantly (and the sample of countries shrinks to five members of the OECD.) Despite these changes, columns (3) and (8) of Table 8 show that most coefficient estimates do not change significantly. Moreover, the stock liquidity coefficient remains highly significant during the second phase of the Asian crisis and becomes highly significant during the Russian crisis. These estimates support the finding reported above: more liquid stocks may be more vulnerable to crises elsewhere in the world.
C. Sensitivity Tests III: Modifying the Base Model Specification
As a final series of sensitivity tests, I estimate a number of modifications to the base model. I begin by estimating a constant-mean-return model instead of a market model. More specifically, I
no longer control for the market index in equation 5 and instead estimate:
44 These eight definitions are: net short-term debt to working capital; net short-term debt to total assets; net short-term debt to total capital; coverage ratio; current ratio; quick ratio; share of short-term debt to total Coefficient estimates are virtually identical to those based on the market-return model. Columns (4) and (9) of Table 8 show these results for the second phase of the Asian crisis and the Russian crisis, respectively.
Next I add a number of additional explanatory variables to the base specification. First, I
control for the impact of firm size by adding several variables to the base regression: total market capitalization; total equity; total assets; total sales; or net income (all expressed in US$). Next, I add a number of controls for total leverage, profitability and company valuation (any of which could indicate problems with over-borrowing and/or crony capitalism): total debt to equity; net long-term debt to equity; total debt to total capital; total debt to assets; return on equity; return on assets; return on invested capital; or book to market value. I also add a set of industry dummy variables (for the industry groups specified in Table 2 ). Columns (5) and (10) of Table 8 report results when a control for firm size is added to the base regression. In many cases, these additional explanatory variables are individually significant (such as market capitalization, total equity, net income, return on assets, and return on invested capital) or jointly significant (such as the industry dummy variables.) In each case, however, adding any of these additional controls has no impact on the significance of the coefficient estimates that are central to this paper.
VII. Summary, Caveats and Conclusions
This paper began by reinterpreting previous theoretical work as describing five channels through which financial crises could affect firms around the world. These five channels are: product competitiveness, an income effect, a credit crunch, a forced-portfolio recomposition, and a wakeup call. In contrast to previous empirical work, which has attempted to analyze one (or more) of these channels using macroeconomic statistics, this paper uses the variation in how different companies are affected by financial crises to provide evidence on how these crises were transmitted internationally. In order to perform this analysis, it uses a new firm-level data set of financial statistics, industry information, geographic data, and stock returns for over 10,000 companies in 46 countries. The remainder of the paper used this dataset and an event-study methodology to test if firm vulnerability to the Asian and Russian crises was affected by factors such as: industry, international exposure, debt ratios, trading liquidity, and/or geographic location. Estimates indicate that firms producing in the same industry as a major export from East Asia or Russia had debt, and the ratio of working capital to assets. I also use changes in the various debt to equity ratios, instead of simply levels. Each of these variables is defined in detail in Appendix A. average abnormal stock returns 8 percentage points lower during the later part of the Asian crisis, or 3 percentage points lower during the Russian crisis. Estimates also show that firms with direct sales exposure to East Asia or Russia had average abnormal stock returns 15 percentage points lower during the later part of the Asian crisis, or 10 percentage points lower during the Russian crisis. These results suggest that trade channels, such as product competitiveness and income effects, were important transmission mechanisms during these events.
During the later part of the Asian crisis, more liquid stocks also had significantly lower returns than the rest of the sample. This could be interpreted as providing evidence in support of the fourth transmission mechanism, a forced-portfolio recomposition effect. Estimates also indicate that firms with higher short-term or total debt ratios were not differentially affected by the Asian or Russian crises. Although only a rough test, this does not support claims that these two crises generated a global credit crunch.
These results are highly robust to a number of extensions, although the significance of several coefficient estimates depends on the definition of the crisis period. The relative importance of the various firm characteristics varies across crises, which is not surprising because how a crisis is transmitted internationally should depend on the characteristics of the country (or region) where the crisis originates. Therefore, it is unlikely that a single model can capture how shocks are propagated during all crises. A final result from these regressions is that countryspecific effects are jointly significant and can be large in magnitude. It is difficult to explain these country-specific effects, however, using a range of macroeconomic and corporate governance variables. This may indicate that country-specific news, i.e. events unrelated to the specific crisis, can have a large impact on stock returns.
These results, however, are only a first step. Several statistics are imprecisely measured (such as dummy variables to capture export competition or direct trade exposure). Most of the variables are only rough proxies for the transmission mechanism discussed in the theoretical models (such as using stock liquidity as evidence of a forced-portfolio recomposition). Reporting errors in the Worldscope database could still affect results. The country-specific effects are largely unexplained and merit closer examination.
Despite these substantial data limitations, this paper does provide strong evidence that two types of trade linkages, product competitiveness and income effects, were important determinants of how the Asian and Russian crises were transmitted internationally. It shows that what industry a firm produces in, and where the firm has sales exposure, can have large and economically important effects on stock returns during crises. Although a firm's geographic location can also affect its vulnerability to a crisis, the magnitude of this effect is generally much smaller than that from other firm-specific characteristics. Finally, the paper shows that firm-level analysis can be a useful complement to the more traditional macroeconomic approach in understanding important international relationships.
APPENDIX A -Variable Definitions 1
Book to Market
Ratio of book value per share to market price. Calculated at company's fiscal year end. Common Equity Common shareholder's investment in a company. Includes common stock value, retained earnings, capital surplus, capital stock premium, cumulative gain or loss of foreign currency translations, discretionary reserves, and negative goodwill. Coverage Ratio*
The ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest expense on debt. Common Shares Traded to Common Shares Outstanding* Common shares outstanding are the number of shares outstanding at the company's year end and is the difference between issued shares and treasury shares. For companies with more than one type of common/ordinary shares, common shares outstanding represents the combined shares adjusted to reflect the par value of the share type. Common shares traded is the number of shares of the company traded during the year.
Current Assets
Cash and other assets that are reasonably expected to be realized in cash, sold or consumer within one year or one operating cycle. Current Liabilities Debt or other obligations that the company expects to satisfy within one year. Current Ratio
The percent of current assets to current liabilities. Days Return is NonZero* Dummy variable equal to one if the stock return is not equal to zero in at least three-quarters of the non-weekend days in the pre-crisis period. Market Capitalization Product of shares outstanding and market price at fiscal year end. For companies >1 type of common/ordinary shares, market capitalization represents company's total market value.
Net Income
Income after all operating and non-operating income, expenses, reserves, income taxes, minority interest, and extraordinary items. Represents income before preferred dividends. Net Long-Term Debt* Any interest bearing financial obligations (excluding amounts due within one year and net of premium or discount) minus cash and cash equivalents.
Net Sales
Gross sales and other operating revenue less discounts, returns and allowances. For financial companies, sales represents total operating revenue. Net Short-Term Debt* Any debt payable within one-year (including the current portion of long-term debt and sinking fund requirements of preferred stock or debentures) minus cash and cash equivalents. Percent Assets by Region* Ratio of assets in a given region to total assets.
Percent Operating
Income by Region* Ratio of operating income in a given region to total operating income, where operating income is the difference between sales and total operating expenses. Percent Sales by Region* Ratio of sales in a region to net sales.
Quick Ratio
The ratio of (cash and equivalents + net receivables) to current liabilities. Return on Assets 100* (Net income before preferred dividends + ((interest expense on debt -interest capitalized) * (1 -Tax Rate))) / Last year's total assets. Calculated differently for financial companies. Return on Equity 100* (Net income before preferred dividends -preferred dividend requirements) / Last year's common equity Return on Invested Capital 100*Net income before preferred dividends + ((Interest expense on debt -interest capitalized) * (1 -Tax Rate))) / (Last year's total capital + last year's short-term debt & current portion of long-term debt) Share of Short-term Debt in Total Debt* The ratio of net short-term debt to total debt.
Total Assets
For industrials: the sum of total current assets, long-term receivables, investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and equipment and other assets. For banks: the sum of cash and due from banks, total investments, net loans, customer liability on acceptances, investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, real estate assets, net property, plant and equipment and other assets. For insurance companies: sum of cash, total investments, premium balance receivables, investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries, net property, plant, and equipment and other assets.
Total Capital
The total investment in the company. The sum of common equity, preferred stock, minority interest, long-term debt, non-equity reserves and deferred tax liability in untaxed reserves.
Working Capital
The difference between current assets and current liabilities.
(1 
APPENDIX B -Sefcik and Thompson's Estimation Methodology
The estimation strategy utilized in Sefcik and Thompson (1986) can be summarized in five steps:
1) Use OLS to estimate equation 5 for the full sample of N firms over the entire time period of length T (including both the pre-crisis and crisis periods.) Obtain the parameter values: ,ˆand ˆwhich are each (N x 1) vectors of i α 's, i β 's and i γ 's, respectively.
2) Rewrite equation 6 in vector form:
with: K continues to be the number of firm characteristics of interest. Then use the ˆ estimated in step 1 and OLS to estimate:
where is a (K x N) matrix for which each row can be interpreted as an estimated weight of the impact of the firm characteristic k.
3) Use the weights implied in to form K portfolios from the original N firms. The crisis should impact each portfolio only through the one characteristic shared by each portfolio. In other words: I ) = where I is a (K x K) identity matrix. Each portfolio (i.e. each row in ) has a zero net value for each characteristic in , except the one characteristic k (which is the row number.) Use these weights to calculate returns for each portfolio: 
APPENDIX CMacroeconomic and Corporate Governance Variable Definitions
Anti-Director Rights
An index aggregating the shareholder rights labeled as "antidirector rights." The index is formed by adding 1 when (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm, (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the general shareholders' meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders' meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent, or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can be waived only by a shareholders' vote. Index ranges from 0 to 6. (a) Data from the annual report in the one year preceding the relevant crisis. Asian crisis is defined as starting on 6/25/97. Russian crisis is defined as starting on 8/17/98. (b) Based on the firm's primary SIC code. Industry definitions are based on two-digit SIC groups defined in Campbell (1996) . The only changes are: the addition of a group for Public administration, and the addition of several two-digit codes (which were not included anywhere by Campbell) to pre-specified groups. More specifically, SIC codes for each group are: Petroleum (13, 29); Finance/real Estate (60-69); Consumer durables (25, 30, 36-37, 39, 50, 55, 57) ; Basic industry (8, 10, 12, 14, 24, 26, 28, 33) ; Food/tobacco (1, 2, 7, 9 20, 21, 54); Construction (15-17, 32, 52); Capital goods (34, 35, 38); 44, 45, 47) ; Utilities (46, 48, 49) ; Textiles/trade (22, 23, 31, 51, 53, 56, 59); Services (72, 73, 75, 76, (80) (81) (82) 87, 89) ; Leisure (27, 58, 70, 78, 79, [83] [84] [85] [86] 88), Public administration (43, [91] [92] [93] [94] [95] [96] [97] Table 4 for variable definitions and regression specification. * is significant at the 5 percent level; ** is significant at the 1 percent level. (a) Dependent variables are the country-specific effects reported in Table 5 and obtained from the regressions reported in Table 4 . Variable definitions and sources are listed in Appendix C. Standard errors are in parentheses and are White-adjusted for heteroscedasticity. * is significant at the 5 percent level; and ** is significant at the 1percent level. (b) Statistic from a test of the null hypothesis that the group of macroeconomic or corporate governance variables are jointly zero. (a) Standard errors in parentheses. Asian crisis firms excluded from the regression. All variables defined in Table 4 except as noted. * is significant at the 5 percent level; ** is significant at the 1 percent level (b) Export competition is redefined using sample statistics (instead of world export statistics) and two-digit SIC codes. (c) Stock liquidity is redefined using the ratio of shares traded to shares outstanding. 
